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Motivated by the disconnect between the seeming impossibility of resolving deep 
metaphysical disputes, and the pressing need for environmental action, many 
environmental philosophers have embraced environmental pragmatism. Environmental 
pragmatists focus on the practical effects of philosophical arguments. With this as their 
agenda, environmental pragmatists have consistently endorsed anthropocentrism as the 
value system for discussing environmental issues, in order to achieve efficacious 
results. This is based on the notion that appeals to human goods are the best means for 
motivating humans to action. This essay will show some conceptual and empirical 
problems with this pretense, to argue that true environmental pragmatists ought to 
supplement anthropocentric values with nonanthropocentric value of the non-human 
world.  
 
One of the most influential environmental pragmatists, Andrew Light, provides a 
valuable distinction between metaphilosophical and philosophical pragmatism. As 
Light describes it, the task of metaphilosophical pragmatism is to “treat pragmatism as 
providing the rules and principles within which environmental philosophy should be 
conducted.”1 This means that the pragmatist must have a “willingness to give up past 
prejudices against certain forms of theorizing... and to embrace some form of pluralism 
in the assessment and communication of normative issues in environmental concerns.”2 
Ultimately, environmental pragmatists wish to engage in theoretical discussions that 
bring about positive real world results. In this spirit, shouldn’t everyone have some 
form of metaphilosophical environmental pragmatism in mind? Arguably, some 
philosophers do not hold any of the metaphilosophical concerns of pragmatism, such as 
Callicott.3 However, if philosophers are reacting to environmental crises, their 
philosophy must return to the empirical problem that initiates their concern. Otherwise, 
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it appears that philosophers are simply enjoying a problem. Enjoying a problem is not 
morally acceptable given the imminent and potentially dire consequences of inaction.  
 
Yet metaphilosophical environmental pragmatism provides no philosophical content. 
The philosophical content of environmental pragmatism is an empirical question: what 
do people value and what motivates people to action? Environmental pragmatists have 
largely assumed that they can fill the metaphilosophical framework with the 
philosophical content of anthropocentrism.  
 
The contributions of Norton and Light have significantly shaped the character of 
philosophical pragmatism. Norton is a fierce proponent of weak anthropocentrism as 
the value system most conducive to motivating people to protect the environment. The 
reasons for this commitment are largely due to metaphysical concerns and the fact that 
intrinsic value is too far reaching of an abstraction to be useful.4
 
  Norton thinks that this 
warrants not only support of anthropocentric value but also the exclusion of 
nonanthropocentric value.  
Norton’s support of anthropocentrism and exclusion of nonanthropocentric value has 
significantly shaped other pragmatist’s attitudes. For example, Light frequently aligns 
himself with Norton’s efforts in supporting anthropocentrism. Like Norton, Light 
claims that nonanthropocentric value “betrays” the metaphilosophical goals of 
pragmatism.5 Furthermore, Light argues that we should abandon nonanthropocentrism 
given “the overwhelming ethical anthropocentrism of most humans (amply 
demonstrated by studies like Kempton et al.).”6
 
  
We find that the contemporary environmental pragmatists’ move to favor 
anthropocentrism is a mistake given the conceptual issues and the available empirical 
evidence. Thus, let us turn to Kempton’s salient empirical study from which Light 
bases his commitment to anthropocentrism.  Kempton highlights both the conceptual 
and empirical problems we wish to address.  
 
How to Read Kempton: Finding a Consensus and Plurality 
 
Kempton’s study of American environmental values is important for several reasons. 
The study is widely considered to be authoritative because its findings are supported by 
an unusually rich and rigorous methodology, adapted from the methods of cultural and 
cognitive anthropology. The study design combines open-ended personal interviews 
with fixed-form quantitative surveys for diversity in data collection methods. 
Kempton’s method combines the freedom of the open-ended response with the 
systematicity of the fixed-form survey. Additionally, this method is strengthened by 
drawing on a large sample population, to establish public opinion, and from carefully 
selected specialist groups that were deliberately chosen to exhibit a wide range of 
environmental views.7  
Res Cogitans (2010) 1                                                                                                         Callanan | 134 
 
 
2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
What makes Kempton’s study particularly interesting is that he finds consensus in a 
plurality of American values. This study shows that Americans value the environment 
in many different ways, thus there is a plurality of values. Kempton analyzes the most 
prominent values into three different yet interrelated value systems: religious, 
anthropocentric and biocentric values. His finding that there is a plurality of values is 
not surprising given the disparity of social, economic, gender, and racial backgrounds 
and varying proximity and relationship to nature of many Americans. What is 
interesting about his study is that the plurality of values is endorsed in similar ways 
among Americans, forming a kind of consensus among seemingly disparate groups. 
This supports his claim that there are such things as American environmental values.  
 
Pragmatists ought to seize the idea of consensus on environmental issues; it partly eases 
the pragmatists’ burden of knowing how to appeal to public interest. This is not to say 
that the pragmatist should cater his efforts to appeal to the majority opinion, for it is 
often necessary to persuade minority groups to enjoin in efforts that the pragmatist sees 
as valuable or worthy. Rather, the range of values that form an American consensus 
ought to be understood for achieving the pragmatists’ metaphilosophical goals. 
 
Environmental pragmatists have rightly noticed a consensus on importance of the 
concern for future generations. For example, Kempton concludes that the “concern for 
the future of children and descendents emerged as one of the strongest values in 
interviews.”8 A landmark study conducted by Minteer and Manning demonstrates very 
similar findings: the concern for future generations ranks highest among American 
environmental concerns in terms of frequency and importance.9
 
  
Unfortunately, Pragmatists have focused on this value to the detriment of implementing 
other values. Furthermore, because Kempton classifies the concern for future 
generations as an anthropocentric value, pragmatists have taken this as evidence to 
support a vow of fidelity, even monogamy, to anthropocentrism. However, the concern 
for future generations is not such a simple value. Kempton notes that the concern and 
emotional force for future generations consistently begins with a concern for one’s own 
children. From here, many abstract to future generations. Thus the concern for future 
generations has an underlying ambiguity that, once realized, shows that there are two 
types of valuation occurring. One classification is consistent with Kempton’s taxonomy 
and the pragmatists’ interpretation: concern for future generations is an anthropocentric 
value. However, the second way that the concern for future generations should be 
understood is egocentric. Impetus to preserve nature out of a concern for future 
generations is not only, perhaps not even primarily, for the sake of continuing humanity 
in the abstract, but in continuing one’s own blood. 
 
We do not discount the consensus and importance of anthropocentric value, for it has 
many appeals. Anthropocentric value obviously appeals to an overwhelming majority 
of people. It is also a versatile value in that it is inherently pluralistic. For example, 
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anything that counts as benefiting humanity is anthropocentric. From a pragmatic 
perspective, pluralistic values are useful; they can more effectively reach a wider 
audience. Typically, pragmatists commit themselves to pluralism, as opposed to 
monism.  
 
However, it is not clear how or why this has resulted in the exclusion of 
nonanthropocentric value. McShane’s comments to Norton serves as a valuable remark 
to other pragmatists, “that it would be an open-empirical question as to which things in 
the world can have preferences of the kind that the theory says are relevant to the 
existence of value.”10
 
 This is another way of saying that the pragmatists ought to be 
flexible enough to use and include any available empirically important value in their 
philosophical pragmatism. Why not be pluralistic in the types of value we admit? 
Admitting of nonanthropocentric value does not mean that it is at all able to trump 
anthropocentric value, and thus push us into monism. Instead, nonanthropocentrism as 
a type of value can add to a fuller pluralism.  
Furthermore, Kempton’s findings do not allow anthropocentrism to be the only value 
pragmatists utilize, no matter how it important it is. Since philosophical pragmatism 
requires an empirical investigation, ignoring the empirical evidence of Kempton’s 
studies is unwise for the pragmatist. We find that many pragmatists today attempt to 
reduce all values into anthropocentrism, blind to the empirical fact that intrinsic 
valuation is already meaningful. Even if the ordinary person does not know what the 
philosophical term “intrinsic” means, Kempton’s findings show that the ordinary 
person widely ascribes intrinsic value to nature. Most often, this intrinsic valuation is 
demonstrated by a spiritual or religious connection to nature and a sense of a land ethic.  
 
The Religious Value of Nature  
 
A portion of Kempton’s study investigates potential religious or spiritual value 
Americans attribute to nature. For those that are religious, most notably in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, Kempton finds that there are primarily two incompatible 
interpretations of scripture that influence people’s valuation of nature. The first is a 
strong anthropocentrism that man is warranted to exploit nature because of his 
“transcendence of, and mastery over nature”.11 However, this valuation of nature is not 
widely held. Furthermore, the informants who expressed this value did not believe it to 
constitute permission to destroy nature. This leads us to the second interpretation of 
scripture: that humans have a duty to protect nature as inherently valuable because it is 
God’s creation.12  More than 75% of people agreed that it is wrong to abuse the natural 
world because God created it. This moral evaluation cannot be captured by 
anthropocentrism. The religious value of nature is nonanthropocentric because it is not 
about benefiting man in terms of economic profit, use of resources, aesthetic 
appreciation, or as a means of salvation. Instead Kempton shows that people articulate 
this religious value of nature as a respect for the sacredness of nature as God’s creation. 
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Sacredness seems to ring of intrinsic value, or at the very least, nonanthropocentric 
value.13 Kempton himself characterizes this appreciation of the sanctity of nature as 
intrinsic value by showing that people infrequently express this relationship as “a 
vehicle for humans to experience God’s presence, peace and healing energy” and more 
often as a direct relationship to nature.14
 
  
Interestingly, Kempton finds that the religious or spiritual value of nature is widely held 
even among people who do not consider themselves religious or spiritual. Furthermore, 
he finds that “religious discourse can be useful to scaffold moral arguments even 
among the agnostic”.15 Even people who claimed no religious or spiritual orientation 
appealed to God to articulate their moral valuation of nature. From this Kempton 
observes that a person “who would not invoke God in other contexts, does so in order 
to talk about (and think about) the meaning she gives to nature.” 16
 
 
The religious value of nature should not be underestimated among environmental 
pragmatists for the American population is widely and often deeply religious. Not only 
is a large portion of our population religious or spiritual, there is strong evidence to 
show that the religious community is an unusually important part of our policymaking. 
This may be because the religious community has an unusually well united voice, and 
is often very active in making their beliefs match their actions. When this united voice 
is conjoined with the finical power of the church, the religious sector constitutes an 
important piece of our democratic process. Furthermore, Kempton shows that the 
religious community widely consider themselves environmental advocates. For these 
reasons, environmental pragmatists should attempt to make the values they promote 
compatible with religious values. Some secular philosophers might balk at adding the 
consideration of religious value to the pragmatist’s toolkit. However, if religious value 
is already meaningful to a large and influential population, as Kempton has shown it is, 
these concerns about accommodating religious value are not coherent with pragmatism. 
Furthermore, it is important not to confuse the religious value Kempton finds with what 
Norton calls transformative value. While Norton is correct that nature does have 
spiritual value in so far as nature provides transformative experiences, Kempton’s study 




Kempton also studies the potential biocentric value of nature and concludes that it plays 
an important role in our moral consideration of nature. One of his significant findings is 
that people commonly ascribe intrinsic value by acknowledging that nature has rights. 
This belief in intrinsic value is most commonly expressed by valuing the survival of 
other species, even when it comes at a cost to humans. Kempton finds that 77-87% of 
the three moderate subgroups believe that “all species have a right to evolve without 
human interference”. When pitted against the interests of human interests, 83-87% of 
the three moderate subgroups disagreed with the claim that there is no reason to worry 
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much about a species going extinct if there is no economic, aesthetic or other human 
use in the species survival. This statistic shows that Americans distinguish between 
anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric values. As a matter of basic logic, in order for 
there to be a distinction, there must be two types of things. This means that ordinary 
people do in fact believe in nonanthropocentric value as different, and at least 
unreflectively irreducible to anthropocentric value.  
 
The high level of agreement reflected in this statistic shows that Americans quite 
uniformly value nature in nonanthropocentric ways. This is made more dramatically 
evident in that, according to Kempton’s study, 40-50% of the three moderate subgroups 
humans would rather see a few humans suffer or even be killed than see a species go 
extinct. If a person is willing to have people suffer or even die for the continuation of 
nonhuman species, it shows that anthropocentric value cannot be the only value that 
enters into our consideration of nature. Even though it falls short of a majority view, it 
shows that a large number of Americans believe strongly enough in nonanthropocentric 
value that they are willing to make human sacrifices in order to respect the intrinsic 
value of nature.  
 
Intrinsic Value Makes Sense of Love and Awe 
 
Properly understanding the plurality of environmental values is important to 
appreciating the shortcomings of excluding nonanthropocentrism. In addition to the 
evidence that Kempton’s provides, Katie McShane powerfully captures something that 
anthropocentric value misses: a proper account of love, affection and awe. McShane 
shows us that any sense of love cannot be adequately understood in a purely 
anthropocentric value system. Environmental pragmatists, particularly Norton, have 
worked to refute her arguments, by showing that love, affection and awe can be 
understood within anthropocentrism.   
 
On the face, Norton’s response looks more like an attempt at salvaging a theory at the 
cost of altering our ordinary conception and use of the term love. People do have a 
sense of awe and wonder when they see the Redwoods for the first time, when they see 
a particularly brilliant sunset or when have love for their pet dog. As McShane shows, 
when a person expresses love for their dog, the direction of affection points to the 
object of affection, not back toward their own self. If the expression of affection were 
not pointed toward the object, would the object be incidental to the emotion? This 
would be like saying that anything that induced a similar effect on the lover would be 
“loved”. While this may not sound absurd initially, it fails to explain why people do not 
claim to love their anti-depression medication. If anti-depressants can induce a kind of 
pleasant emotion, then why not love them? What if there was an even more powerful 
drug that could induce a stronger emotion than the affection one has for one’s dog or 
wife? On an anthropocentric account, why would we not substitute the pill for our dog- 
or put stronger yet- our spouse?  
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This example brings to light two important issues of our ordinary concept of love. First, 
most people would not imagine the above scenario as even a possibility; the substitute 
would be a hallow replacement. However, anthropocentrism cannot explain the 
common intuition that this is a hallow replacement. A more intuitive explanation is 
readily available to the nonanthropocentrist: the love of the pill is empty because the 
object of affection matters, whether it is for a spouse, dog or tree. As McShane 
indicates, the object of affection is not incidental to our ordinary use and experience of 
love. Part of what happens when we experience love for someone or something is a 
recognition of and respect for the qualities and character of the loved. This is not only 
in respect to bettering or benefiting one’s self, but rather an intrinsic appreciation for 
the loved. Because there is nothing intrinsic to the pill to love or respect, the concept of 
pill-love is entirely vacuous. Norton may refute this argument through a reduction of 
love into anthropocentrism, but this project makes no sense from a pragmatic 
perspective. If people’s use of “love” seems to indicate an intrinsic appreciation of the 
loved, if the emotion is a relatively unreflective one, then attempts to show a “hidden” 
nature to love has no clear pragmatic payoff. This suggests that Norton’s tactic of 
incorporating love into anthropocentrism is not an adequately pragmatic approach to 
McShane’s findings. Instead, Norton’s intellectual fight looks like a dogmatic 
commitment to anthropocentrism when considering the philosophical flexibility of 
pragmatism.  
 
While McShane’s arguments provide a powerful case to the shortcomings of 
anthropocentrism, she does not offer an account of how a pragmatist can use her 
findings. We propose that a proper pragmatic response to McShane is to figure out how 
to make McShane’s findings useful. The immediate consequence of this is that the 
pragmatists’ agenda is best fulfilled by ceasing projects that attempt to reduce 
nonanthropocentrism into anthropocentrism at the cost of making certain concepts- or 
emotions- unintelligible to the ordinary person.  
 
The cost of making concepts fit into an anthropocentric framework is too high in that it 
obscures our ordinary experience and use of emotions. Furthermore, emotions are too 
valuable to lose because emotions often are as powerful a motivating force to action as 
intellectual reasons. We agree that obscuring terms and concepts are not conducive to 
achieving practical ends. The pragmatists’ project of reducing nonanthropocentrism 
into anthropocentrism results in unnecessary and abstractions to otherwise accessible 
values. In this way, environmental pragmatists have not been pragmatic enough.  
 
How the Pragmatist Can Use Nonanthropocentric Value 
 
So how should a pragmatist use intrinsic value? One option becomes clear when 
understanding McShane’s and Kempton’s findings together. Kempton finds that 97% of 
responders consider themselves an animal lover.17 If McShane is correct, as we believe 
she is, then Americans nearly universally attribute intrinsic value to the nonhuman 
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world. If McShane is right, intrinsic value is not only extremely common but also an 
important value in explaining how people relate to their environment and the creatures 
within it. For even if people do not explicitly recognize it, their love, awe and respect 
rely on a nonanthropocentric value of the nonhuman world. Furthermore, the presence 
of intrinsic value seems to be quite unproblematic for the ordinary person, even if they 
are not familiar with the philosophical term “intrinsic,” people seem to be widely 
ascribing it to nature without difficulty. This suggests that intrinsic value is a 
meaningful concept in making sense of our relationship to nature and its creatures. 
Finally, if people care about the object for its own sake, as is consistent with 
McShane’s account, this seems to be a very easy and effective way for a pragmatist to 
motivate people into action that is in line with their values. In other words, being 
limited to anthropocentrism seems to only hinder the pragmatist in accessing an already 
meaningful source of value. 
 
Though McShane’s account seems to have more pragmatic payoff and seems to better 
account for our unexamined experience of love, awe and affection, what if Norton is 
really correct? Even if Norton were correct, his account results in a theory that is too 
abstract and disconnected to be very useful. Perhaps Norton’s findings might salvage 
anthropocentrism as the only source of value, but it seems to limit our ability to make 
sense of people’s ordinary experience of love. As Norton admits, pragmatists don’t care 
about what is true, but what is useful.18
 
 We have shown that McShane’s account can be 
made entirely useful for understanding the widely held values of many Americans. Not 
only is Norton’s reduction of love into anthropocentrism not useful, but it also fails to 
recognize the potential use of intrinsic value to his practical ends. We ask that Norton 
better adhere to the principles he claims to be committed to.  
How Should Pragmatism Now Direct its Efforts? 
 
The study of people’s values of nature is an entirely relevant pragmatist question 
because it can reveal people’s relationship to and moral evaluation of nature. However, 
valuation does not equal motivation, which does not equal action, and pragmatists care 
about action. Though this presents a worry, understanding value and supporting a 
philosophy that is conducive to people’s values is a start toward practical ends. The 
next pragmatic course of action is to assimilate the plurality of values demonstrated by 
Kempton into a pragmatic framework. Once this has been achieved, the empirical 
question of how to convert these values into motivation and subsequent action is 
necessary. This is a slightly different question that many pragmatists have been asking.  
 
Conclusion: Intrinsic Value for the Environmental Pragmatist 
 
Whether or not people are in fact motivated by intrinsic value is an empirical question. 
This essay has used Kempton’s studies to show that intrinsic and nonanthropocentric 
value is an important and widely held environmental value. Without doubt, 
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nonanthropocentrism does not exclude the prominence of anthropocentrism in 
contributing to people’s moral consideration of nature. Though anthropocentric value is 
nearly universal, Kempton finds that “Americans overwhelmingly reject statements that 
nature’s only function is to serve man”.19 Instead, anthropocentrism is expressed as one 
of many environmental values: religious, anthropocentric and biocentric.20
 
 
Environmental pragmatism strives for a worthy goal of affecting practical results as a 
response to pressing environmental crises. However, based on the empirical evidence, 
environmental pragmatist’s sole commitment to anthropocentrism betrays their 
metaphilosophical commitments. Based on the empirical evidence, giving up on 
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